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For most of the 300 years since Nicholas Bernoulli submitted his thesis Usu Artis Conjectandi in Jure (The Use of the Art of Conjecturing in the Law), the use of mathematics particularly, probability and statistics in legal reasoning was contemplated by courts in the U.S. and England with considerable suspicion. However, the passing of the Civil Rights Act in the 1960s ushered in a wave of state and federal cases that presented unique issues of proof, and began the slow process of legitimizing the use of statistical evidence in the courtroom. These decisions, together with the rise of increasingly advanced technologies at issue in the disputes between parties, has opened the door to the introduction of other mathematical arguments that must be harnessed by attorneys, presided over by judges and decided by juries. This talk begins with a review of some of the mathematical principles and techniques that regularly make appearances in U.S. courtrooms whether applied correctly or incorrectly sometimes with dispositive consequences. Moreover, the increasing use of mathematics in court raises significant pedagogical questions: For example, what is the most effective way to integrate mathematical training into the curriculum of students entering the legal profession? How can ongoing education most efficiently be structured for judges who must decide cases in an increasingly technical world? And how do the rules and procedures that govern the presentation of expert testimony in court support or hinder the ability of jurors to quickly grasp the essence of a mathematical assertion? This talk explores a few of these connections between pedagogy and jurisprudence, with the aim of highlighting opportunities to improve the quality of mathematical discourse in both the legal classroom and the courtroom |
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